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Abstract
Background: Securing and managing finances for multicentre randomised controlled trials is a highly complex
activity which is rarely considered in the research literature. This paper describes the process of financial
negotiation and the impact of financial considerations in four UK multicentre trials. These trials had met, or were
on schedule to meet, recruitment targets agreed with their public-sector funders. The trials were considered
within a larger study examining factors which might be associated with trial recruitment (STEPS).
Methods: In-depth semi-structured telephone interviews were conducted in 2003–04 with 45 individuals with
various responsibilities to one of the four trials. Interviewees were recruited through purposive and then snowball
sampling. Interview transcripts were analysed with the assistance of the qualitative package Atlas-ti.
Results: The data suggest that the UK system of dividing funds into research, treatment and NHS support costs
brought the trial teams into complicated negotiations with multiple funders. The divisions were somewhat
malleable and the funding system was used differently in each trial. The fact that all funders had the potential to
influence and shape the trials considered here was an important issue as the perspectives of applicants and funders
could diverge. The extent and range of industry involvement in non-industry-led trials was striking. Three broad
periods of financial work (foundation, maintenance, and resourcing completion) were identified. From
development to completion of a trial, the trialists had to be resourceful and flexible, adapting to changing internal
and external circumstances. In each period, trialists and collaborators could face changing costs and challenges.
Each trial extended the recruitment period; three required funding extensions from MRC or HTA.
Conclusion: This study highlights complex financial aspects of planning and conducting trials, especially where
multiple funders are involved. Recognition of the importance of financial stability and of the need for appropriate
training in this area should be paralleled by further similar research with a broader range of trials, aimed at
understanding and facilitating the conduct of clinical research.
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The system for funding clinical trials in the UK is highly
complex and has, in recent years, been subject to a
number of changes (Table 1 describes the UK funding
model as of December 2005). Trial teams must engage
with this evolving system if they are to resource their
research. The major sources of funds available in the UK
are the public sector funding bodies such as the Medical
Research Council (MRC) and the Department of Health's
(DH) Health Technology Assessment (HTA) Programme,
charitable bodies and industry. In recent decades, concern
has been expressed that the funds which are available
from the public sector funding bodies, have become
severely constrained [3-5]. Increasingly, formal links or
partnerships with industry are being built into UK fund-
ing strategies to maximise additional support to encour-
age and facilitate clinical research [6].
Even when funds have been secured, financial issues can
be an ongoing concern for trialists, with problems arising
during the course of a trial. One example is the effect of
the need to comply with the recent EU Clinical Trials
Directive; it has been argued that this places already
strained budgets under additional pressures [7]. Some
researchers have reported that these pressures have
directly affected recruitment rates [8] and have in fact
forced some trials to close [9,10].
How trial teams negotiate funding systems and how they
address financial considerations which arise in the course
of clinical trials has not yet been described in the research
literature. There is in fact surprisingly little empirical work
on financial considerations at all, other than brief refer-
ences in a small number of USA-based studies [11-17].
These indicate the costs of conducting clinical research in
terms of clinician hours may be considerable [11], and
that a lack of funded clinician time for research [12-14],
and a lack of support staff [15-17], are both thought to
have a direct and negative impact upon recruitment rates
[18]. In these few studies the financial focus largely relates
to the accrual of patients into trials. There remains a lack
of empirical evidence in relation to the subject of how tri-
alists actually deal with financial considerations in their
various forms and how these might shape the trials in
which they are involved.
This paper reports data on this subject arising from a qual-
itative study which was carried out in 2004. It was con-
ducted within the broader context of the Strategies for
Trials Enrolment and Participation Study (STEPS), a
multi-method research project which examined factors
which might be positively or negatively associated with
recruitment to RCTs [19,20]. STEPS was commissioned by
the National Coordinating Centre for Research Methodol-
ogy in the UK with funds from MRC and HTA. STEPS had
three distinct components; an epidemiological review of a
cohort of 114 trials funded by MRC and HTA [20]; the
qualitative study which considered four trials which
appeared to have particularly interesting lessons for
recruitment [21]; single in-depth case study of a large
multi-centre trial to examine the feasibility of applying a
business-orientated analytical framework as a reference
model in future trials [22].
The qualitative component of STEPS explored the views of
UK trialists, clinicians and other professionals, all of
whom were associated with one of four multi-centre trials.
Two of the trials received funding from MRC and two
from HTA. Although financial aspects of trial manage-
ment were not the primary focus of this study, it became
clear during data collection and analysis that they were of
particular importance to many interviewees and were con-
nected to a range of issues other than simply recruitment
rates. The ways in which financial considerations were
managed were often presented by the interviewees as cru-
cial elements in the success of their trial. Finance was,
however, also seen as a potentially problematic factor
which could directly impact on aspects of the trial design
Table 1: The UK funding system as of December 2006
Types of costs Definition (for detailed explanations see [1]).
Research costs These are costs needed in order to run and manage a trial and are met by bodies such as MRC and HTA. They fund the direct 
costs of the co-ordinating and possibly the recruiting staff (if salaries are not already covered from other sources), equipment, 
and consumables, as well as indirect costs to cover institutional support.
NHS support costs These costs are associated with delivery and assessment of interventions which occur only during the course of a trial. These 
include the means to deliver trial interventions to participants, the costs of hospital stays and of additional clinician time. They 
also include clinical assessments such as scans, X-rays and physical examinations.
Trial treatment costs These include the costs of the intervention itself, the purchase of any equipment associated with that intervention, and costs 
of continuing delivery of an intervention subsequent to the period of research. These may be sought either from industry, in 
the form of donation of drugs, equipment or funds or from NHS through their partnership arrangement with MRC and DH 
[2], or in exceptional circumstances as a specific request to DH. This latter option is available when an intervention has 
substantially greater costs to the NHS than the standard care which would normally be offered. Trial teams may apply for 
excess treatment costs to be met as a subvention by DH. The costs of placebos manufactured to match the active drugs are 
considered to be research costs but may be met by industry.Page 2 of 18
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of concern led to further consideration of this substantial
strand of the data. This paper therefore describes the ways
in which the four trial teams negotiated the UK funding
system, and reports the views of informants on the impact
of financial issues on the trials in question.
Methods
The research setting
In contrast to the approach often reported in the empirical
literature, where research is conducted to understand why
recruitment failed for a particular trial [15,23-27], the
STEPS team wished to learn from trials which offered pos-
itive examples. The two funders of STEPS, MRC and HTA,
were therefore asked to recommend a number of the trials
in their research portfolios which they considered to be
successful. After consultation between the funders and the
STEPS team, four multicentre 'exemplar trials' were
selected which had met, or were on schedule to meet, tar-
gets agreed with their funders. They were chosen to repre-
sent diverse research settings, methods and clinical
specialties. One principal investigator (PI) declined par-
ticipation as he intended to publish details of their suc-
cessful recruitment practices separately. Another trial from
the funders' lists was selected as a replacement.
The four trials considered here are: The Heart Protection
Study (HPS) [28,29]; Trial of Chemotherapy for Bowel
Cancer (Fluorouracil, Oxaliplatin and Irinotecan (CPT11)
Use and Sequencing (FOCUS) [30]; A pragmatic single-
blind RCT and health economic evaluation of leukotriene
receptor antagonists in primary care at steps two and three
of the National Asthma Guidelines (ELEVATE) [31]; and
Trial of Outcome for Child & Adolescent Anorexia Ner-
vosa (TOuCAN) [32]. Each trial was an ambitious project
as, irrespective of the differences in their target sample
sizes, each was intended to be the largest in the world for
their particular population. Recruitment is now complete
in all trials with targets exceeded for HPS and FOCUS,
whilst TOuCAN, and ELEVATE exceeded their targets in
the main elements of their samples. Broad details of these
four trials are presented in Table 2 and their structure, his-
tory and progress are described in further detail elsewhere
[19].
Ethics
Multi-centre Research Ethics Committee approval was
given for the qualitative study under "no local researcher"
guidelines. The study conformed to local research govern-
ance requirements and approval was given by 12 NHS
Trusts Research and Development departments.
Sampling and recruitment process
Despite the fact that many different professional groups
contribute to running a clinical trial, there is little research
which recognises the variety of roles involved. Exceptions
are the work by May and colleagues which considers the
evaluation of telehealth interventions from the perspec-
tive of clinicians, technical experts, evaluators, managers,
policy actors and patients [33,34] and by Hamilton-
Brown which considers the tension between research and
clinical practice in the area of substance abuse treatment
Table 2: The four trials
TRIAL SPECIALTY POPULATION MANAGEMENT RECRUITMENT 
SETTING
INTERVENTIONS DESIGN FUNDERS
HPS
(The Heart 
Protection Study)
Cardiovascular 
health promotion
Patients at 
increased risk of 
coronary heart 
disease
Clinical Trials Unit Hospital - Statins (Simvastatin)
-Antioxidant vitamins
- Placebo
4 arm randomised 
trial (2 × 2 
factorial)
MRC
BHF
Industry
FOCUS
(Trial of 
Chemotherapy for 
Bowel Cancer 
(Fluorouracil, 
Oxaliplatin and 
Irinotecan (CPT11), 
Use and Sequencing)
Oncology Patients with 
advanced 
metastatic 
colorectal cancer
Clinical Trials Unit Hospital Chemotherapeutic 
agents
- Modified de 
gramont with 
fluorouracil
- Irinotecan
- Oxaliplatin
5 arm randomised 
trial with cross-
over
MRC
Industry
NHS Trusts
ELEVATE
(A pragmatic single-
blind RCT and health 
economic evaluation 
of leukotriene 
receptor antagonists 
in primary care at 
steps two and three 
of the National 
Asthma Guidelines)
Asthma 
management
Primary care 
patients with 
asthma requiring 
regular 
preventative 
treatment or an 
increase in therapy
University 
Department
General Practice - Leukotriene 
receptor antagonists
- Inhaled 
corticosteroids
- long-acting beta 
agonists
3 arm randomised 
trial (with option 
to switch 
treatments post-
randomisation and 
parallel non-
randomised 
'naturalistic' 
cohort for patients 
refusing 
randomisation)
HTA
Industry
PCTs
TOuCAN
(Trial of Outcome 
for Child 
&Adolescent 
Anorexia Nervosa)
Adolescent 
psychiatry
Adolescents (aged 
12–18) with 
anorexia nervosa
Hospital/university Hospital and out-
patient service
- intensive inpatient 
treatment
- general local 
outpatient service
- specialist outpatient 
service
2 severity strata 
(steps) with 2 arms 
at each step
HTAPage 3 of 18
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which are available predominantly seek the views of sen-
ior doctors, largely those associated with oncology trials
[24,36-43]. There are some studies which include nurses
associated with trials [15,44] and general practitioner
(GP) recruiters [45-48]. We were unable to identify
research which considered the views of trial co-ordinating
staff.
For this study a broad model of potential interviewees was
drawn up at the planning phase, based upon an initial
concept of which professional groups were likely to con-
tribute to running the trials. The study was designed to
include 32 interviews, 8 per trial, split between central co-
ordinating staff and staff from recruiting clinical centres.
The intended interviewees were PIs, trial managers, local
lead consultants in the recruiting centres, and local
recruiters (doctors or nurses depending on trial proce-
dures). The aim of representing this range of responsibili-
ties was not to characterise the views of particular
professional groups, but to draw upon and explore differ-
ent experiences of the four trials. By allowing these key
players to describe the history and workings of each trial,
multiple perspectives could be used to generate a compos-
ite and nuanced account of how the trials developed and
were run.
As understanding of the processes involved in each trial
increased, a flexible and responsive approach to recruit-
ment was adopted. The list of interviewees was adapted
and expanded accordingly to fit the unique circumstances
of each trial. The first interviewees were recruited through
purposive selection methods. The funders, MRC and HTA,
introduced the study team to the PIs, who in turn facili-
tated access to the central trial teams and some recruiting
centre staff. The central teams made contact with a range
of collaborators via their own mailing lists. Those inter-
ested in taking part in the research were invited to respond
directly to the STEPS researchers to preserve confidential-
ity. Once interviews were underway recruitment proce-
dures drew upon elements of snowball sampling as
interviewees suggested the importance of approaching
particular colleagues with specific roles in a trial. In a
small number of cases the researcher made an unmedi-
ated direct approach to individuals who were detailed in
the trial literature who seemed to be potentially important
to the study. Given the combination of direct and medi-
ated approaches to some individuals, an opt-in volunteer
system for others, and the fact that it is not known how
many individuals were contacted by the trial teams, it is
not possible to give a response rate. This approach to
recruitment added 13 interviews to the study, and the
sample comprised 45 interviews in total (Table 3).
At the end of the study 11 interviewees (5 PIs, 4 trial man-
agers, 1 local lead and 1 academic staff) were contacted
again for validation purposes. They were asked to view an
almost final draft of the relevant chapter in the report to
the STEPS commissioners, as well as this paper, to moni-
tor accuracy and to verify the findings. Small amendments
to factual details were suggested and all supported the
conclusions that were drawn.
The interviews
All interviews were carried out by telephone between
December 2003 and May 2004. They were tape-recorded
with the consent of interviewees and fully transcribed.
They were semi-structured and typically took between 20
and 80 minutes, depending upon the degree of connec-
tion with a trial. Discussions were often wide ranging.
They highlighted very different levels and types of respon-
sibilities, as well as individual attitudes to, and experi-
ences of, the trials. Because the study included
professionals with a variety of roles, some questions var-
ied from interview to interview, as well as from trial to
trial. The lines of questioning were also modified and
developed during fieldwork, in response to the insights
gained. To preserve confidentiality, interviewees are not
named. Their trial-specific role is not given unless
unlinked from a specific trial. They are identified by their
interview number preceded by the first initial of the trial
acronym e.g. H-1.
This study used telephone interviews to collect qualitative
data. The possible advantages and disadvantages of this
method have been considered by several authors [49-51].
Telephone interviews are often used in conjunction with
other approaches in mixed methods studies [52-54], but
have also been used as a single data collection method
with patients [55,56], and clinicians [57,58]. Sweet [59]
describes this approach as "a methodologically and eco-
nomically valuable data collection technique in qualita-
tive research" (p.58). In this study the use of telephone
interviews permitted recruitment of a sample with a wider
geographic distribution (England, Scotland and Wales)
than would have otherwise have been possible. It allowed
the team to respond to the emergent need to include addi-
tional interviewees. The topic under consideration was
amenable to discussion by telephone and there was no
sense that the discussions or the researchers' understand-
ing of the data were limited as a result of this method.
Analysis
All interviews were conducted, read and analysed by one
researcher (CS), with team members (JG and DE) reading
a sample of interview transcripts, and commenting on sig-
nificant portions of data as requested. Data analysis was
conducted with the assistance of the qualitative package
Atlas-ti. The analysis was shaped by the intention to pro-Page 4 of 18
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and comparative in nature and took direction from Lay-
der's "adaptive theory" [60]. Layder suggests an approach
whereby pre-existing researcher knowledge and concepts
are an explicit part of the analytic process. Existing models
held by the researchers are adapted in a process of modi-
fication and refinement as experience and understanding
of a phenomenon grows. The study findings were there-
fore a product of both pre-existing perceptions of what
was likely to be of importance (the interview schedule)
and the unanticipated issues which were introduced and
made clear through the accounts of the interviewees
themselves. The significance of financial considerations
was the most striking of the issues which emerged from
the interview and analytic processes.
Financial issues were originally considered within the
larger interview schedule through the practical process of
setting up a trial and whether or not a funded extension
was later required. As the interviews progressed increasing
attention was paid to the ways in which trial teams dealt
with financial matters and the impact they might have on
their research. For the qualitative study as a whole, which
considered factors which may have contributed to success-
ful recruitment records, the analytic process identified
four overlapping Key Stages in the course of each trial;
these were "Foundation work" "Recruitment", "Delivery
of care" and "Delivery of Research". Foundation work
included engagement of scientific and clinical collabora-
tors, establishment and communication of a trial's scien-
tific credentials through development of appropriate
research questions and methods, and attention to funding
and financial considerations.
Further analysis of the interviews where financial consid-
erations were discussed, highlighted and drew out the
ongoing and mutable nature of this element of the trials
process. Twenty-three interviewees are cited here (HPS 4,
FOCUS 7, TOuCAN 7, ELEVATE 5). Financial considera-
tions clearly cut across all of the Key Stages. Recognition
of the way they are interwoven throughout the course of
the trials led to delineation of three broad areas of finan-
cial activity, namely:
• Economic foundation work
• Maintenance work
• Resourcing completion
The division of different types of costs associated with
clinical research in the UK, and our division of financial
considerations into three broad areas, might suggest a
neat, compartmentalised approach to funding. They
imply discrete and definable costs which would be met
through a clear budget at the foundation stage, before
research gets underway. In fact the interviewees described
a fluid response to the funding system and reported a vari-
ety of funding-related experiences. The similarities and
differences between the ways in which financial consider-
ations were experienced in each of the four trials are con-
sidered in detail below
Table 3: Sample structure
FOCUS ELEVATE TOuCAN HPS TOTALS
CENTRAL CO-ORDINATING STAFF
PIs √* √*√* √*√* √* 6
Trial managers √ √* √* √*√* 5
Central recruiters √√ √√ 4
Administrative 
support
√ 1
Statistician √* 1
Clinical support √* √*√ √ 4
4 6 7 4 21
CLINICAL STAFF IN RECRUITING/REFERRING CENTRES
Local lead 
investigators
√*√* √*√√ √*√*√*√√√ √*√ 13
Recruiting doctors √√ 2
Recruiting nurses √√*√* √*√√ √√√ 9
7 6 6 5 24
TOTAL STAFF 11 12 13 9 45
* CITED HERE 7 5 7 4 23Page 5 of 18
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Economic foundation work
For many trials the preparatory work to develop the intel-
lectual direction of the research, to gain the trust and sup-
port of potential clinical collaborators, to attract the
interest of funders, and to address logistical considera-
tions, starts several years before a trial actually com-
mences. This process can involve a long run-in period of
discussion with a variety of potential funders, to consider
the value of the proposed research, its design, and to plan
financial support for costly trial interventions.
Negotiations with industry for treatment costs
For two of the trials, HPS and FOCUS, the preparatory
process included negotiations with representatives from
the pharmaceutical industry from a very early stage.
The funding strategy employed by the HPS team initially
relied exclusively on industry to fully support the costs of
both their pilot study and their main trial. The team
aimed to evaluate cholesterol-lowering therapy (statins)
and antioxidant vitamins for a diverse group of patients at
increased risk of coronary heart disease. The very large
quantities of active drugs, placebos and vitamins which
were to be used represented a considerable cost. In the
course of the industry-funded pilot work the trialists real-
ised that a major shift in study design was needed in order
to best answer the research questions and a decision was
made to substantially increase the sample size. The associ-
ated rise in costs caused difficulties in negotiations with
the intended funders, and brought about a long delay
between the pilot and the main trial, as explained by a
member of the central trial team:
The gap that occurred between the pilot and the main study
was merely an issue of getting the funding. We had initially
been thinking about a ten thousand patient study but the
more we got into it the more we felt that a bigger study of
twenty thousand patients would make more sense and we
couldn't persuade [the drug company] to fund that. (H-40)
If the trialists wished to maintain control of the research
design and to increase their sample size, they had to forgo
their initial funding arrangement. With such a large and
hugely expensive trial in mind, they faced an enormous
financial challenge. It was necessary to bring together a
consortium of funders, each to be responsible for a differ-
ent element of the trial costs. This resulted in a highly
complicated seven year process in which there were sev-
eral offers and retractions of offers of funds. Another
member of the central trial team explained that in this
period their funding situation was extremely precarious,
with a delicate dynamic between potential funders: "peo-
ple wouldn't want to commit unless other people had
committed and so ... very skilful negotiations had to take
place" (H-42). The trial eventually cost £21 million.
Research costs were shared by MRC and the British Heart
Foundation. Two major pharmaceutical companies met
the substantial treatment costs associated with their own
products. Securing and co-ordinating this level of multi-
sourced funding was "extremely difficult" (H-40), and
required "a prolonged effort" (H-39). The lag between the
pilot study and the main trial proved to be of conse-
quence; it not only delayed publication of useful research
findings, it also allowed other trials of cholesterol-lower-
ing therapies to report their results during the intervention
period for HPS. Some clinicians associated with HPS
altered their treatment patterns in response and it was
thought that this may have diluted the size of the effect of
the trial interventions in HPS. One interviewee explained:
There were some types of patients in HPS for whom their
own doctors [decided] to use cholesterol-lowering therapy.
The study would have achieved a bigger LDL [low-density
lipoprotein] cholesterol difference between the treatment
groups if it had been done earlier. (H-40)
For HPS the size of the contribution required from indus-
try was the trigger for renegotiation of their funding
arrangements. For the FOCUS trial, additional considera-
tions shaped their discussion with potential funders. The
history of the development of this trial was described in a
small number of interviews which revealed a similarly dif-
ficult period of complex discussion and negotiation with
industry.
FOCUS was designed to address the issue of how best to
treat patients with advanced metastatic colorectal cancer,
in the light of the development of two chemotherapeutic
drugs, irinotecan and oxaliplatin. These drugs had been
evaluated in previous trials but had not been directly com-
pared, nor had there been direct comparison of the same
drug used in first- or second-line therapy. One of the inter-
viewees explained that they felt that an assessment of
these drugs by "the independent academic sector" was
important."
There were a number of issues which we felt needed
addressing which were, if you like, different in nature to the
type of questions which were being posed in the drug com-
pany trials using those compounds. And we felt that there
was a need ... for a large trial which had end points which
were relevant to patient care, looking at overall survival
over the duration of treatment and also looking at issues for
quality of life and toxicity when those new drugs were being
used. (F-2)
The FOCUS team faced financial, logistical and political
challenges given the very high cost of these drugs, the
inclusion of NHS patients, and the potential differences inPage 6 of 18
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difficulty lay in the fact that they planned to "compare
drugs [from the two different companies] head to head,
and drug companies are very unwilling to do that nor-
mally" (F-4). Furthermore, the team were trying to estab-
lish the foundations of their research in a particularly
difficult system, as an interviewee explained.
[T]he NHS was not well set up for doing research involving
expensive drugs unless [a] drug company came along and
provided those drugs. ... [T]he dilemma we had with
FOCUS was asking questions which were independent of
the drug companies and weren't necessarily commercial
questions which the drug companies wanted [us] to ask, but
at the same time using their drugs, which were expensive.
(F-2)
The challenge they faced was "how to obtain the drugs
and get them into a trial which would involve a lot of
patients in NHS hospitals around the country" (F-4).
The interviewees described what one termed as "a long
drawn out process of negotiation" (F-2) with industry as
well as with the NHS (see below) to bring together the
level of funding needed for the treatment costs. The
descriptions of this process made it clear that in this
period of trying to reach agreements over funding, the
commercial agenda has the potential to influence the
design of a developing trial. The interviewee quoted above
argued that this agenda is of great importance, stating
"they don't want to do research which is going to put
them out of business" (F-2).
When you negotiate with drug companies over obtaining
drug supplies for trials, you usually find yourself negotiating
with somebody who's from the business unit or marketing
unit of the company where, obviously, the priorities and the
issues which they bring to bear when they're looking at trial
designs and trying to make decisions about whether they're
going to invest will be commercial and business decisions.
(F-2)
The process by which the trial team and the drug compa-
nies came to their agreement about funding and research
design was "fairly tortuous and painful at times" (F-3). An
interviewee described how this tricky and delicate process
can be facilitated or inhibited by some of the less formal
elements of the negotiations.
What happens is that individual clinicians ... know individ-
ual people in drug companies, and there are sort of contacts
made. And sometimes ... you have very good rapport with
those people and they can sort of oil the wheels and make
things happen, and other times it's very difficult. ... We had
someone who was very supportive of the trial in one of the
drug companies, and they really pushed it very hard with ...
whoever makes decisions ... but in the other drug company,
there was someone who ... just wasn't willing to play ball at
all ... (F-4)
Over a two year period in which, as for HPS, offers of
funds were made, modified, withdrawn and renegotiated,
the team had to try to "maintain our integrity and not to
compromise the questions and the integrity of the trial
design" (F-2). Key informants felt that despite the difficul-
ties they faced, they had not made concessions over the
research question or trial design, one commenting that "
[we] held our ground" (F-4. This was not, however, with-
out financial implications.
We ended up with a trial design where we had pretty much
stuck to our guns and where the amount of drug company
funding was very much less than we might have [had] if we
had compromised the design a bit more. (F-2)
With hindsight it was suggested that the difficult negotia-
tions, and the multiple offers and retraction of offers of
funds, had created significant and inappropriate delays to
the research. This led to reflection on the practice of
involving industry when research questions are of impor-
tance to the NHS but are not of direct commercial interest.
In retrospect it might've been better if we hadn't actually
obtained any funding from drug companies in the first place
for FOCUS and we'd actually gone along to the subvention
committee with a more expensive trial and said ... "We
want to do this trial. We've got no support from drug com-
panies, please provide a subvention" and maybe they
would've done that. (F-2)
Seeking research costs from public sector funding bodies
Public sector funders have an interest in ensuring that the
research they support asks appropriate questions of
importance for public health and public services in a sci-
entifically rigorous way. When they apply for funds, trial-
ists can be required to defend or modify their proposals in
order to meet the standards set by the funding bodies.
The four trials considered here were all successful in their
applications for research funds from MRC or HTA. For
FOCUS, this stage appeared to be the least problematic
element of their difficult funding process. A member of
the central trial team commented that their research costs
were fully met and their application to MRC "went
through without a hitch." (F-4).
HPS also received funds from MRC and the importance of
prior negotiations between the researchers and the funder
was discussed in one interview. The trial was designed to
include, amongst other subgroups, older patients andPage 7 of 18
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known about the impact of reducing cholesterol for these
groups. These suggestions were of concern to MRC, and
were also raised in their discussions with industry. MRC
wished to impose a lower upper age limit, and a higher
lowest cholesterol level on the eligibility criteria, largely
from concern that there were no precedents for lowering
cholesterol for these groups. The researchers and MRC
came to an agreement:
[O]ur protocol initially had no upper age limit and no
lower cholesterol level and .. particularly MRC said they
would not fund us if we didn't have an upper age limit and
we didn't have a lower cholesterol level. [W]ith respect to
the lower cholesterol level we managed to get agreement
that it be at a level that would actually exclude no one or
almost no one... [For age limit] we could shift the upper age
limit up if the Data Monitoring Committee on reviewing ...
the first thousand patients or so... did not observe any obvi-
ous problems and so ... we then shifted it up but .. it was
difficult at that stage to include very much older patients.
(H-40)
In comparison to the lengthy developmental processes for
FOCUS and HPS, ELEVATE and TOuCAN were designed
in response to HTA calls for applications to address very
tightly defined research questions. For ELEVATE, the call
was fortuitous as some of the senior trialists were already
wishing to address the same issues given their own
research interests. The trial that they developed compared
the role and cost of a class of orally administered drugs,
leukotriene receptor antagonists (LTRAs), to inhaled cor-
ticosteroids (ICS) and long-acting beta agonist (LABs) for
primary care patients who have asthma which requires
regular preventative treatment or an increase in therapy.
LTRAs have been available for some years and can be pre-
scribed for asthma patients but LABs are more commonly
used. LTRAs are of interest as they are in tablet form and
may prove to be more acceptable than drugs delivered via
inhalers, and so may promote better disease control. They
are however the more expensive intervention. A member
of the ELEVATE team explained that the call to consider
this area was to some extent a coincidence, but it was also
a reflection of the direction that research in the area was
taking. It "fitted with what we were wanting to do. ... We
had recognised it was a needed research area and also HTA
had." (E-15). For this application "the bidding group ...
fell together very easily and looked like a strong team." (E-
13). The team had to work together quickly to develop
their application.
We fought and negotiated and struggled over a protocol
that one, met our research agenda and two, met the
research agenda of HTA, to come up with a protocol that
was real-life, going to give us cost-effectiveness data, [and]
was do-able in general practice ... And then got through to
the second round at which time you then spend a lot more
time. ... [Y]ou get a little bit of feedback. I guess the one bit
of feedback that in retrospect was probably a problem was
from HTA that they thought our costs for general practice
were too expensive. ... Reviewers often do not understand
how difficult it is to truly deliver research in primary care.
(E-15)
The team altered their plan to train audit assistants from
general practice to assist with the trial, and replaced this
with a cheaper option to employ a research assistant,
despite feeling that they had suggested realistic costs. This
cost-based decision had later ramifications for the recruit-
ment process (see below). An interviewee who had sup-
ported the initial approach to recruitment commented
that in retrospect he felt they possibly "should have stuck
more firmly to [our] guns knowing what I do now. But we
did that and ... we submitted a full protocol ... and got
accepted." (E-15). The team then experienced a delay
related to a general HTA funding issue in which the future
of ELEVATE was unclear; they felt that HTA was going to
"pull the funding for this project" (E-15). In the words of
another interviewee, the trial "sat on the shelf for about a
year and a half" (E-12) before they were told that it could
proceed. Negotiations for the treatment and excess treat-
ment costs for ELEVATE were started after the initial
research funds were awarded.
As for ELEVATE, the senior TOuCAN researchers had
wished to carry out a trial in their specific area for some
time. They wished to assess the efficacy of approaches to
care for adolescents with anorexia nervosa and were keen
to understand whether it was better to have intensive
inpatient treatment at an earlier stage in the condition, or
whether this should be reserved for the more difficult,
entrenched cases. They also wished to assess the possible
value of a recently developed specialist outpatient service.
Whilst the ELEVATE team felt that there was a degree of
coincidence in their own interests and those of HTA, an
interviewee from the TOuCAN team felt that the clinicians
in their area had been proactive in raising the issue of the
need for research and that HTA, after a period of consulta-
tion, had responded:
[I]t comes about by clinicians and researchers ... lobbying
or pushing ... for the need for it and eventually the message
being heard by funders. (T-27)
RCTs are not widely used in relation to the management
and treatment of anorexia nervosa [61] and previous
attempts to bring about a trial had been unsuccessful. The
HTA call for proposals was not specifically for a ran-
domised trial, but several interviewees felt that the radical
step of suggesting this method was important in the suc-Page 8 of 18
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element in the funding decision for this trial.
Research costs relating to staffing decisions
Within discussion of research costs more generally, a par-
ticularly important sub-category of funding issues
emerged. The funds awarded by MRC and HTA cover a
range of costs associated with running research, but the
interviewees predominantly focussed on those associated
with the employment of research staff. Whilst other costs
such as institutional overheads or computing resources
are generally fixed or reflect straightforward costing deci-
sions, those associated with staff stem directly from prac-
tical and strategic decisions about how individuals will be
deployed to manage and facilitate a trial. They relate to
matters of research design (e.g. number of intended par-
ticipants, number of collaborating centres), and to admin-
istrative and recruitment strategies (location of
recruitment, responsibility for identification and recruit-
ment procedures). Although funders do not make their
decisions based purely on the total cost of a proposal, sal-
aries do add substantially to overall running costs and
decisions about staffing could directly affect the chance of
funding. Proposals which are seen as inappropriately
expensive, or those where costs have been trimmed to the
extent that the research is not feasible, are both likely to
encounter difficulties.
Each trial team chose to staff their research and delineate
responsibility for the identification and recruitment of
research participants in different ways. The choices made
suggested that two elements underpinned their
approaches. These were, firstly, the strategic use of availa-
ble resources, and secondly, recognition of the need to
take account of the specific conditions of each clinical set-
ting.
The trial which undoubtedly placed the greatest invest-
ment in staff was HPS, a long-term trial with 69 recruiting
centres, each with at least one fully-funded, centrally-
trained, research nurse. The research nurses were not
involved in the processes of identifying eligible patients.
They ran trial-dedicated clinics in collaborating hospitals
to which potentially eligible patients were invited. The
identification and invitation process was controlled by the
central administrative team. The research nurse assessed
eligibility, discussed trial enrolment and recruited trial
participants. A member of the central co-ordination team
explained that this very specific demarcation of roles was
crucial to keep a large multi-centre trial on track and to
keep substantial costs under control:
It is a big study to keep the budget under control. We
needed to think of ways to keep the cost down and we felt
that if ... the processing of the data, the invitations, the
appointments, all the administration was central rather
than peripheral then that should be another way of increas-
ing efficiency and reducing costs. (H-40)
A clinician who acted as the local lead investigator in a
collaborating centre affirmed the value of the use of staff
funded directly by the trial in practical and political terms.
He was asked whether it would have been feasible to have
collaborated with the trial without such a post.
Oh no, no, no, absolutely not! I think for research like this
it has to be funded separately. If it was in competition with
our service commitment it would very quickly be sidelined
and we wouldn't be able to do it. (H-44)
Although the resources needed to employ staff to carry out
recruitment are legitimate research costs, they were not
always included within the initial request for research
funds. This was the case for TOuCAN which utilised a very
different staffing structure and recruitment strategy from
HPS. The trialists were aware that recruitment for TOu-
CAN was potentially very difficult; there was little prece-
dent for RCTs in relation to the management of eating
disorders, the potential participants were widely distrib-
uted across the caseloads of many clinicians in the region,
and it was important to gain access to a high proportion
of these cases. They did not, however, feel that employing
a large number of trial staff to control the process of iden-
tifying potential participants would be helpful. TOuCAN
was deliberately and firmly set within existing forms of
care, and involved a network of consultant psychiatrists in
a highly localised regional setting in the recruitment proc-
ess. The trial was "embedded in the [local] clinical service"
(T-33) and much effort was directed towards generating
and maintaining support for the research, with "lots of
persuasion, lots of visits to local services" (T-27) with an
emphasis on "building relationships with the consult-
ants" (T-30). One consultant acknowledged the work that
was done to "keep people like me on side" (T-32). The
success of the first phase of recruitment rested entirely on
the ongoing identification of eligible patients by the col-
laborating clinicians as each was referred into their
caseload. This crucial role was unpaid and voluntary. The
subsequent administrative and recruitment processes
were controlled by a very small number of central trial
staff whose salaries were met via the HTA research funds
Although there was little in terms of financial incentive to
collaborate with the trial, some collaborators felt that
there were potentially beneficial resource implications.
Half of those enrolled in TOuCAN would be randomized
away from the care of their referring clinician, and effec-
tively moved on to the caseload of the specialist service.
Whilst it was said that some clinicians felt a degree of con-
cern over losing control of these very sensitive cases, it wasPage 9 of 18
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individuals, who can be "costly cases in terms of time and
resources" (T-38) would be passed over to receive special-
ist care, and that it can be "a relief to get a difficult case off
your mind" (T-35).
The system of relying on the goodwill and interest of the
collaborating clinicians for referral worked well, and the
trial accessed the majority of the target cases. This
appeared to be precisely because it was so closely backed
onto existing professional and clinical systems of referral
that according to a referring clinician it "just sort of
blended in with what you'd usually do." (T-38). Another
clinician argued however that this was due to the very par-
ticular nature of TOuCAN, and that other trials would
require a different type of research support from a central
trial team:
[W]hen we've been involved in trials before of things that
are commoner, and where the burden on the service of actu-
ally referring or involving people in trials is more, ... in
those circumstances providing additional administrative
resources as well as nursing resources would be a really
important factor. ... [W]here we've been involved in
research, it's been the admin team which is really over-
whelmed by extra demands.... . [For trials] in ADHD
genetics and depression treatments and things like that, we
would've needed both nursing support or, you know, some
kind of clinical support and admin support to be able to do
these things easily. (T-32)
The decisions about how to fund the staff associated with
the FOCUS trial were quite different from those made for
the other trials. Clinical research in oncology is overseen
and supported by the National Cancer Research Network
(NCRN). Research is high profile and collaboration is
routine in most large oncology centres. Specialised
research nurses are essential members of staff who work
with whichever trials are linked to their unit. The FOCUS
Trial was developed as part of a rolling programme of
research and drew on the support of an existing network
of committed collaborators. This determined both the
staffing structure for the trial and the associated financial
costs.
Procedures for identification and recruitment of partici-
pants were entirely under the control of experienced staff
whose salaries were already funded in the collaborating
centres. As for TOuCAN, it was usual for a consultant to
identify eligible patients as they presented in their clinical
caseload. The consultant would initially explain the trial
to patients, usually in the context of discussion of the
management of their advancing metastatic disease. They
would be referred on to a research nurse who would give
further details of FOCUS and arrange to see the patient
again. At the subsequent appointment the nurse would go
through consent procedures if they wished to enrol in the
trial and initiate the allocated intervention. In this way the
clinical staff worked in close collaboration with research-
related staff.
The collaborating centres were given a contribution
towards the costs of their research nurses from the FOCUS
research funds. This allowed for some protected time for
FOCUS, but much of the cost associated with recruitment
and subsequent administrative tasks were in fact absorbed
by the centres. This was possible because they had their
own resources and staffing systems developed specifically
to support research collaboration. Interviewees from one
recruiting centre explained that resources for a research
nurse who could work with FOCUS and other oncology
trials were provided through Trust R&D funding systems.
Another interviewee explained how their ability to collab-
orate with research had increased as a result of the ability
to apply for their own funding for research-related staff
from the NCRN. This was seen as a positive step as it per-
mitted centres to raise their level of collaboration with tri-
als more generally:
[W]ith the NCRN, we've got 12 nurses now and some data
managers so it actually does make it easier... There is a def-
inite improvement. (F-6)
Many oncology centres collaborate with industry-spon-
sored trials and it is common for payments to be made for
each participant recruited. An academic member of the
FOCUS team suggested that these payments, which can be
"in thousands" (F-1), are "not at all a bad thing" precisely
because they can provide an element of stability to the
research infrastructure within collaborating centres. Effec-
tively the costs of collaboration with trials such as FOCUS
are subsidised though existing links with industry. In
comparison to the payments made to recruiting centres by
industry trials, those from public sector trials can be far
less lucrative. A senior research nurse explained how the
less lucrative links can be problematic.
[W]e find that the money we're gaining from commercially
sponsored studies actually pays for the nurses. ... [T]he
NRCN studies only give us something like two hundred
pounds a patient for data collection. ... It costs a lot more
than that, and in our institution it's usually the industry-
sponsored studies, the money we make from that [which]
will pay for the nurses. ... We have a commitment to MRC
trials first. We would always recruit to them before an
industry- sponsored one because we're an academic depart-
ment. [But there are] ... issues of paying research nurses'
wages and [if] you've got a study that pays five thousand
pounds per patient or one that pays two hundred pounds per
patient.........! (F-10)Page 10 of 18
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collaborating centres, competition for staff time between
non-industry and industry-led trials can also be problem-
atic. The nurse argued that "one of the main problems was
staffing" (F-9). Centres can be under "a lot of pressure
from the drug companies" (F-9) to maintain their records
and keep on top of their trial-related administration, wary
of the possibility of inspection of records in relation to the
EU Directive. This pressure meant that in this centre
efforts were diverted from the public sector trials which
therefore fell behind; essentially "other priorities had
come into the forefront" (F-9). A research nurse post was
developed by local staff to address an administrative trial-
related backlog in their centre.
FOCUS ... had sort of fallen by-the-by with data manage-
ment ... [T]he sheer workload was too much for the
research nurses that we had. (F-9)
While attempt were made to catch up with the administra-
tive backlog for FOCUS, clinicians put recruitment of new
patients temporarily on hold.
[F]or a couple of months [they] just put people on the
standard [treatment] and didn't [recruit] because [they]
knew that we couldn't manage the workload. (F-9)
This account suggested important ways in which financial
issues, in practical and political terms, directly shaped
recruitment to a trial at a local, behind-the-scenes, level.
Negotiations with service providers in relation to NHS support costs 
and excess treatment costs
With research costs covered by MRC or HTA, and the
costs, or partial costs, of drugs to be used in a trial secured
from an external source, the trialists also had to consider
how to meet any excess costs associated with unfunded
drugs, and the delivery and assessment of care. As HPS
had agreed the funds for the trial drugs with industry, and
removed the delivery of the research interventions and
subsequent assessment from the NHS setting, there was
no obligation to negotiate NHS support costs or excess
treatment costs. The interventions in TOuCAN so closely
approximated the existing care arrangements that again
there was not an issue of excess costs to the NHS. By con-
trast the negotiations for FOCUS and ELEVATE were com-
plicated and sensitive.
Trials such as FOCUS which have MRC funding should, in
theory, be supported by an agreement with NHS Trusts,
known as the NHS Research Concordat [2,61]. Under the
terms of this agreement, if MRC covers research costs,
NHS Trusts are obliged to take responsibility for 'legiti-
mate' service support and treatment costs associated with
a trial. It was anticipated that the Concordat would facili-
tate collaboration with FOCUS for individual centres and
generally the NHS Trusts did comply with the Concordat.
The Trusts were, however, "in different states of financial
distress around the country" (F-2), and the excess treat-
ment costs associated with the trial were substantial, and
the agreement did not provide the broad support that had
been expected. It was necessary to apply to the NHS Trust
of each potential collaborating centre, for the excess treat-
ment costs to be met. One of the clinical lead investigators
in a collaborating centre explained how for them it had
been "straightforward", but was not so for others.
[In our region the Concordat is] considered to be authori-
tative and [they] will honour their responsibilities to pro-
vide us with excess treatment costs. ... I'm very aware of
other centres and the problems they had [when their Trust]
would not fund the excess treatment costs in this trial. So a
number of areas ... were not able to contribute patients,
although they wanted to. (F-3)
The ELEVATE trialists faced a similar issue in that GP prac-
tices which might collaborate with their trial were
accountable to NHS Primary Care Trusts (PCTs) for any
increase in their prescribing budgets incurred through
their association with the trial. In this setting there is no
equivalent to the Concordat. Rather than relying on PCTs
to, in effect, subsidise the research, the trialists entered
negotiations which centred on their keeping costs to the
PCTs "neutral" (E-15). The trialists provided funds to the
PCTs to offset any treatment costs and so facilitate their
collaboration and that of the GP practices. These offset-
ting funds were sought from industry. One interviewee
explained the importance of this.
We managed to get industry to make a ... contribution to
the excess treatment costs, to head off the resistance we
thought we might encounter particularly from the [PCTs]
holding the drug-prescribing budgets for primary care. ...
Because the leukotriene receptor antagonists are more
expensive than other therapies, it could have pushed up
their prescribing costs. ... Certainly once you make a formal
approach to GPs to participate in a study like this, one of
the questions that they are bound to ask is 'Is this going to
get us into trouble with the PCT?' ... So we managed to get
a no-strings-attached contribution from the two companies
who manufacture leukotriene receptor antagonists, which
we've been able to pay into the local PCT drug budgets, on
a proportionate basis according to the number of practices
that were participating in the study. ... I think if we hadn't
been able to get that going, we might have had whole PCTs
[and] whole groups of practices who might have said 'No,
we won't participate because the excess treatments costs
aren't covered'. (E-13)Page 11 of 18
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given a contribution to their funds to cover nursing time,
something which was thought to be likely to promote "a
stronger collaboration" (E-13). Although one GP argued
that this did not in fact cover the costs involved, it was still
widely viewed as an effective and essential strategy.
Maintenance work
The bulk of the financial considerations for these trials
undoubtedly occurred in the foundation stages described
above. It became apparent, however, that even when the
trials were funded and recruitment was underway, finan-
cial challenges could arise at further points in the course
of the research. This was particularly evident for two of the
trials, ELEVATE and FOCUS, where trialists had to
respond and adapt to changing financial situations in two
particular areas. Interviewees from these two trials
described:
• the need to renegotiate trial finances
• the need to weather financial storms
The need to renegotiate trial finances
ELEVATE encountered major difficulties in recruitment
and this was accounted for partly by the 18 month delay
in receiving the funds from HTA. The time-lag meant that
the trialists were faced with carrying out their research in
a different research climate from that which they had
envisaged. The trial involved recruitment of patients with
uncontrolled asthma, who would be appropriate candi-
dates for a change in their therapy. Interest in this group
of patients had grown since the funds were initially
awarded.
[P]harma-companies were really pushing for this group of
patients to go on to additional therapy so many of our eligi-
ble patients had been 'stolen' if you like by the pharmaceu-
tical companies. ... I mean there was still a pool of patients
there but they were the slightly more difficult-to-access
patients. (E-15)
This background of competition with an industry trial for
eligible patients was undoubtedly a challenge, and was
exacerbated by difficulties encountered in the general
practice environment. ELEVATE, like TOuCAN, aimed to
bed the research into the clinical setting by including GP
practices in recruitment processes. As the trial was devel-
oped by GPs, in consultation with GPs, there was sensitiv-
ity to the fact that costs which might be incurred could
have personal as well as institutional financial implica-
tions for collaborators. A GP explained the nature of the
problem:
General practices are actually small businesses and they are
funded in a completely different way to hospitals. ... If you
are a teaching hospital there may be funding in the system
for the idea of supporting research. In general practice
research is not a core thing that is funded at all. ... Even
things like sending out letters, stamps on envelopes and sec-
retarial time, all of that costs money. The only place that
that money will come out of is the practice profits, which is
basically the partners' income. So unless it is adequately
funded you are actually asking the individual GPs to take
home less money in order to do the research. That is just not
the case in hospitals. It doesn't affect the doctors' or nurses'
incomes at all [if] research goes on. (E-23)
Although the trial team were aware of these issues, the
trial still required greater human resources than were
anticipated. It quickly became evident that recruitment
problems in the GP practices were, in great part due to the
trial-related workload which fell to the practice staff. The
trial team reacted swiftly, seeking additional research
funds from HTA in order to radically modify their admin-
istrative procedures. The entire method of identification
and recruitment of potential participants was refined and
shifted towards an approach which was similar to that
used by HPS. The renegotiated HTA funds allowed the
workload to be directed away from practices, removing
the requirement for their staff to carry out time-consum-
ing searches to identify eligible patients, through payment
for additional trial staff and the occasional use of inde-
pendent agency research nurses. GPs and practice nurses
mentioned during the interviews that without this more
intensive input, collaboration would have been difficult if
not impossible.
The most important thing in the ELEVATE Study has been
the support from the researchers. ... I contrast that with a
study I was doing for a commercial research organisation
which was overly burdensome with paperwork, very poor
support from the research assistants ... and in the end we
didn't recruit anybody for their trial. (E-21)
The need to weather financial storms
For ELEVATE the problems with recruitment were identi-
fied early in the course of the trial. For FOCUS, difficulties
arose in relation to debates about the evidence of clinical
effectiveness and treatment costs which could have
derailed the trial, two years into recruitment. In 2002 the
National Institute for Clinical Excellence (NICE) argued
that existing and emerging data on improvements in sur-
vival times for irinotecan and oxaliplatin did not warrant
the costs associated with their routine use in first-line ther-
apy. NICE issued guidelines recommending that irinote-
can should be used only after failure of a first-line
treatment, and that the use of oxaliplatin be restricted to a
small sub-category of patients [62]. The guidelinesPage 12 of 18
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group, oxaliplatin was now available only via the trial, to
which NICE recommended recruitment. Secondly, NICE
had recommended second-line irinotecan when first-line
treatments had failed, when two of the arms in the trial
did not employ irinotecan. Furthermore, NHS Trusts
which had not permitted their hospital departments to
refer to FOCUS because of the associated treatment costs,
were being specifically directed to make such referrals
through the NICE guidance.
The NICE guidance caused concerns which were expressed
in a letter to a newspaper by 28 oncologists, almost half of
the UK oncologists practising in this speciality. They
argued that the restrictions placed around irinotecan and
oxaliplatin would reduce life expectancy [63]. The trial
team responded in this difficult period by adapting the
trial design to allow patients who had received oxaliplatin
to cross over to irinotecan, and those that had received iri-
notecan to cross over to oxaliplatin. At this stage the phar-
maceutical company withdrew its support and stopped
providing irinotecan for FOCUS, a move which interview-
ees felt was a direct consequence of NICE's guidelines on
treatment costs. This appeared to be a major financial
challenge to the trial, with several interviewees stating that
they expected serious consequences, "an absolute disas-
ter" (F-4). In spite of these concerns, the recruitment rate
remained steady, with the collaborators' NHS Trusts effec-
tively absorbing the treatment costs for patients who were
referred to the trial.
Information gleaned from interviewees from the collabo-
rating centres sheds further light on possible reasons for
the continuing commitment to the trial. Although it was
clear that the costs of the drugs, and the limitations
imposed by NICE did cause concern, some stated that
after the NICE guidance they recruited to the trial with the
explicit aim of accessing the drugs. A consultant described
how he presented the complicated funding situation for
oncology drugs to patients who were eligible for FOCUS.
He described a need to balance giving honest information
without applying pressure, given the already difficult situ-
ation of those with advanced metastatic cancer:
You don't want to force a patient to go into trial, but I do
say that by going into the FOCUS study, there is oxaliplatin
available. We don't have funding for that outside the study.
(F-6)
It seemed that by this time the trial, its community and
patterns of intervention were sufficiently established that
the contentious issue of treatment costs and the loss of
industry support, did not impact upon recruitment at all.
Completion work
Towards the end of the research process the trialists had to
engage once again with financial considerations to ensure
that their trials achieved their aims. All of the trials needed
to extend their recruitment periods. Recruitment for
FOCUS was slower than expected and took place over
three and half years rather than the planned three years. It
was, however, possible to accommodate the longer
recruitment period within the original funds. With a time-
only (i.e. no-cost) extension from MRC, FOCUS exceeded
its target of 2100 participants by 35 cases.
The other three trials all required funded extensions from
MRC or HTA. With regard to the funding extension which
was awarded to HPS, an interviewee explained that it was
in fact a calculated element of the original funding strat-
egy. The request for an extension was not made in
response to difficulties arising in the research process but
a deliberate budgeting plan:
We always knew that we would have to have a funding
extension ... We had only applied for a five or six year grant
so it was always anticipated that we would need an exten-
sion. (H-39)
The completion work for TOuCAN and ELEVATE required
some reorganisation of their design, as well as the input of
additional funds and time. Although recruitment was very
successful for TOuCAN, it became evident during the
recruitment period that the target of 210 adolescents (70
per arm) randomised into the RCT was not going to be
met within the original timeframe. TOuCAN included an
additional naturalistic arm wherein up to 70 adolescents
who declined to have their care randomised, but wished
to contribute to the research, could be followed up. The
shortfall in both the trial and the naturalistic arm was
attributed to the fact that although the clinicians had
referred "quite a lot of young people" (T-34), the trial
team was notified about significantly fewer cases than
they had anticipated. Even with accrual of 90% of the
referred cases, the initial calculations needed reassess-
ment.
We did a revised power calculation part way through ... and
we found that we would still just have enough power if we
could get to 50 in each [of the] randomised groups. The
rate of recruitment was that we went back to the HTA and
said "Look we, we've got this far but we're actually signifi-
cantly off our recruitment rate. We need an extra year of
recruitment." And they gave us an extra year. (T-27)
With new power calculations the trial target was revised to
55 adolescents per arm, and 75 in the naturalistic arm. A
funded extension was awarded by HTA. The target was
exceeded with 167 participants recruited to the trial, withPage 13 of 18
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figures were achieved in three and a half instead of the
intended two years.
Further funds were also granted by HTA in response to
revised costings for ELEVATE. At the time of the interviews
the trial team were still trying to work out their strategy for
completing the trial. One interviewee described the way
forward as "currently under debate." (E-12) One of the
strata of the trial was proving to be particularly problem-
atic and the team were facing a decision, essentially that
they had to "decide whether we're going to try to get a fur-
ther extension or whether we're going to eat into the fol-
low-up period" (E-13). Another interviewee similarly
described the choices that they felt they faced.
We either will fail or we will revise. ... [We could] keep
recruiting for long enough that a slower recruiting rate gets
us there but we then have a shorter follow-up for some peo-
ple. (E-12)
Further funds were requested and awarded and the trial
exceeded the intended sample size of 356 participants for
one stratum, recruiting 361 participants, and recruited
325 of the planned 356 participants for the second stra-
tum. The choice to reduce the length of the follow-up
period for the second stratum enabled the recruitment
period for this group to be extended without another
extension of the amount or period of the funding.
Discussion and conclusion
The aim of this analysis was to explore how a group of trial
teams negotiated the UK funding system for clinical trials
and how financial considerations in their various forms
might shape their research. The trialists and collaborators
interviewed for this study described difficult and sensitive
activities which went beyond simply making a grant
application and balancing the books. Their accounts high-
light important ways in which the funding system and
broader financial matters affected both the development
and subsequent conduct of their trials. They suggest that a
major challenge for the teams was often to secure the
financial support that they needed, and to conduct the tri-
als with the fewest compromises to their vision of the sci-
entific, clinical and ethical elements of their research. Of
particular significance in the accounts of those who
resource and manage clinical trials was their experience of
dealing with a slow moving, multipart, intricate and at
times apparently fragile funding system.
Although there appears to be a clear demarcation of the
three different types of costs which need to be met
(research, NHS support, and treatment), and delineation
of which bodies are responsible for each, the teams in fact
described quite individual ways of utilising the system. In
part these related to how they had chosen to design and
structure their trials. A trial designed to include many
patients or expensive drugs required industry support
rather than relying on NHS Trusts. A trial backed closely
onto standard care procedures required fewer funds for
research staff, even though these could have been sought
as a legitimate research cost. The trialists' use of the fund-
ing system appeared to be as much a product of what they
felt was appropriate, given their research design and its
relation to the clinical environment in which it was
placed, as of the structure of the funding system itself.
An important element in this system for three of the trials
was the need to deal with the multiple funders, a tricky
and often delicate process in its own right. It often
involved nurturing and sustaining the interest of one
potential funder whilst engaging with the (potentially dif-
ferent) concerns and priorities of another, a difficult jug-
gling act which commenced sometimes years before the
trial could get underway. FOCUS, HPS and ELEVATE all
experienced major and ultimately significant funding-
related delays, arising from their discussions with poten-
tial funders. These delays meant that the circumstances in
which the trials were eventually conducted were altered,
allowing other research to have been developed or to
report in the meantime. Their experience suggests that
efforts to facilitate the speedy progress of research through
the funding system would be of clear benefit to funders
and applicants alike.
Of particular significance was the fact that each of the
three main funders had the ability to shape the research in
quite significant ways. The public sector research funders
(MRC and HTA) intervened directly through the review
process for applications for funds to ensure that their per-
ceptions of how the research ought to be conducted were
taken into account. The NHS Trusts and PCTs could block
expensive research in their area, despite the existence of
funding agreements such as the Concordat. The funding
sector which raised the most discussion in the interviews
was, however, undoubtedly the pharmaceutical industry.
The extent of the influence, direct and indirect, that indus-
try appears to have over trials which do not in fact origi-
nate within their own sphere was striking.
Collaboration with industry can provide important
means to run clinical trials [64,65] and was crucial to the
development and ongoing progress of HPS, FOCUS and
ELEVATE. This form of support allowed the trialists to
finance the drugs necessary for their research, to have
funds at their disposal to facilitate important collabora-
tions, and even to provide extra staff or equipment when
needed. Interviews with clinical staff in FOCUS collabo-
rating centres suggested that lucrative collaborations with
industry trials helped to sustain an infrastructure whichPage 14 of 18
(page number not for citation purposes)
Trials 2006, 7:34 http://www.trialsjournal.com/content/7/1/34was vital to their involvement with a range of public sector
funded trials.
The relationship with industry is, however, not without
problems. This "uneasy alliance" [5] of potentially com-
peting aims has been likened to "dancing with porcu-
pines" [4,66]. Concerns which have been expressed to
date largely relate to the potential for conflict of interests
[65,67-70]. The trialists interviewed here were very much
aware of the differences between their own research
agenda which were focused on developments for patient
care, and the commercial agenda of the pharmaceutical
companies. Research suggests that they are right to be cau-
tious, demonstrating that links with industry can shape
the design and implementation and results of clinical tri-
als [71-73]. Trials that are funded in this way are more
likely to produce "pro-industry conclusions" [74]. They
are also becoming increasingly prevalent with concerns
being expressed that control of the clinical research
agenda is passing from academia to industry [75]. Those
interviewees who had participated in discussions over the
design of their trials used terms such as "stuck to our
guns", "held our ground" and "stood firm" to convey the
challenges involved in their negotiations. This research
suggests that there are also other ways in which the rela-
tionship with industry might affect the research process.
The withdrawal of funds from FOCUS part-way through
the recruitment period highlights a degree of vulnerability
for trials which are reliant upon this type of funding.
FOCUS is not alone in this experience as a number of tri-
als have been forced to close when funds were withdrawn
for commercial reasons [76-79]. It also became clear that
there could be direct competition between the trials con-
sidered here and other industry-led trials, either for the co-
operation of collaborators or for access to eligible
patients. In the case of ELEVATE the loss of whole groups
of patients from GP practices in their geographical area
severely hampered their recruitment processes.
TOuCAN stands alone in this study as a trial which is of
little interest to industry. Trials which assess interventions
with little or no potential for commercial application are
heavily reliant on charitable and public sector funding [3].
Hemminki and Kellokumpu-Lehtinen [7] suggest that the
same is true of cutting edge research in areas such as gene
therapy and cancer vaccines, with their complexities of
intellectual property rights and manufacturing difficulties.
The particular needs of non-commercial trials have been
acknowledged by the European Union [80]. Although
such trials have fewer funding opportunities available to
them, it may be that TOuCAN benefited from a simple
funding process and did not require complex negotiations
with industry. It was the only trial of the four considered
here which was not perceived by the interviewees to be
affected by financial difficulties. The not-inconsiderable
treatment costs associated with in-patient and out-patient
care which were assessed within this trial were met within
existing contractual agreements between service providers
and the referring services. The smooth transition from pre-
vious care arrangements to research-led procedures, map-
ping research onto an established practical and financial
framework of referrals and delivery of an intervention,
gave this trial a clear advantage. Freed from having to con-
sider complicated practical and political issues of treat-
ment costs, and maintaining the support and interest of
industry funders, the central trial team were able to work
on engaging and motivating the linchpin collaborators in
the important clinical and scientific issues at the heart of
the trial.
Once the trials in this study had obtained their necessary
finances, they were still faced with financial considera-
tions in the course of their research. The trial teams in this
study acted in a number of dynamic ways to address
unpredictable financial issues as they arose, and to pre-
vent financial difficulties destabilising their trials. The
ELEVATE trialists for instance quickly secured the
resources necessary to modify their approach to recruit-
ment and enable additional staff to be deployed where
needed.
The teams also had to find the strategies or means to bring
their trials to completion. They were not at all unusual in
obtaining extensions either in time or money or both.
This very common phenomenon amongst clinical trials
[81] might occur for a number of reasons. Trials may be
under-funded in the first place, because it is so difficult to
predict the actual level of funding that will be required, or
because circumstances and so costs can change between
the application for funds and the recruitment period.
TOuCAN required a funded extension because there were
fewer eligible adolescents available than had been antici-
pated. It may also be the case that investigators strategi-
cally under-bid in order to secure some funding, even if
this is unlikely to be sufficient for the entire trial.
The experiences reported here indicate that a range of
skills and a degree of agility are required for negotiations
with potential funders and collaborators, and for the
ongoing financial balancing act that managing a trial with
substantial research budgets entails. Those who are
responsible for these onerous tasks receive little, if any,
training in this area. The development of systems to sup-
port and train researchers in trial processes, such as those
being provided by the UK Clinical Research Network [6]
would seem to be appropriate. It may also be desirable for
public sector funding bodies to demonstrate reciprocal
skills and flexibility in assessing the financial plans of
research applicants, assisting with the integration of theirPage 15 of 18
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progress of on-going trials.
This qualitative study was based on four trials which were
all identified by their funders as exemplars. It is probable
that the extension of this research to a larger number of
trials including those considered less successful would
have provided additional insights into this complex proc-
ess. The study was carried out in the UK in 2003–04 and
the four trials, each with their own timescale, had encoun-
tered the funding process at different times in its evolu-
tion. Some changes in resourcing arrangements have been
made since the interviews were conducted. There have
been moves towards Full Economic Costing for research
which may help to increase the transparency of funding
decisions and processes. The recent implementation of
the EU Clinical Trials Directive may mean that trials
require even larger amounts of funding, thus making it
"all but impossible to carry out researcher-led studies
without the financial and logistical backing of the phar-
maceutical industry" [9]. Indeed, the problem of inade-
quate funding for clinical trials was highlighted by the
Academy of Medical Sciences [64], which suggested the
need for a new funding structure and the development of
an effective research infrastructure to aid efficient organi-
sation of clinical research and training. The UK Clinical
Research Network [6] was established in 2005 to provide
such an infrastructure, and early in 2006, plans for a sin-
gle, ring-fenced budget to support the health research cur-
rently funded by the MRC and HTA programmes were
announced for consultation [82].
The specifics of funding arrangements are bound to differ
over time and between different countries. The important
general lesson from this study is the need for attention to
be paid, by funders and trialists, to the complex practical
and financial aspects of planning and conducting a trial,
whatever the prevailing funding system. Given the likely
influence of the level of funding on the degree of success
of clinical trials, it is surprising that this element of the
research process is virtually invisible in the research liter-
ature. A focus on the issues raised in the financial manage-
ment of research should be one part of the development
and continuing assessment of methods which are aimed
at facilitating the conduct of sound clinical research in the
future.
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